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One of the most striking and frequently praised aspects of HBO’s cult 
TV series The Wire is its purported realism. Why this series is virtually 
unanimously perceived as realistic is the main question that this paper 
will attempt to answer. The question is addressed from the perspective 
of Robert Brandom’s neo-pragmatist rationalist philosophical project 
in general, and his account of the appearance/reality distinction in 
particular. The first part of the paper introduces Brandom’s neo-pragmatist 
rationalist account of the relation between appearance and reality as 
explicated in his book Reason in Philosophy. The second part addresses 
the question of the verisimilitude of The Wire in these Brandomian 
rationalist terms. It is thereby suggested that, first, The Wire appears to 
be real because it is rational—i.e. because it rationally integrates all its 
commitments into a single unified whole—and second, it is recognized 
as real because it exhibits an expressively progressive structure—i.e. 
it gradually makes explicit the commitments that were held implicitly 
throughout the course of its five seasons.
Keywords: The Wire, Robert Brandom, neo-pragmatism, rationalism, 
realism, verisimilitude.
INTRODUCTION
“Don’t seem possible. That’s some Spiderman shit there.” As every fan 
of HBO TV series The Wire will recognize, these memorable words are 
uttered by Marlo Stanfield, as he gazes in disbelief at the fourth story balcony 
window through which Omar Little jumps and disappears, while being shot 
at by Marlo’s ‘muscle’ (“The Dickensian Aspect”, S05E06). It is safe to say 
that Marlo’s disbelief was shared by most of the show’s long-time viewers, 
unaccustomed as we were to that kind of action-hero imagery. The scene 
in question, although it might not have been the first, was one of very 
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few instances in all five seasons that actually seemed (in this case, wildly) 
implausible. These few exceptions aside, with regard to the often-mentioned 
and praised verisimilitude of The Wire, a simple rule of thumb can be applied: 
If you have seen it on The Wire it is not only possible that it could happen 
in real life, but it is highly likely that it did. In fact, as unlikely as this scene 
appeared during the first viewing (and indeed on any subsequent viewings), 
according to David Simon (and later confirmed by the man in question),1 it 
was based on a real life event. Larry “Donnie” Andrews, one of the real life 
counterparts of Omar Little, really did escape death in a similar fashion, the 
only difference being that Donnie had to jump from a sixth story window. 
In his pitch to HBO for The Wire, David Simon states his ambitions 
with regard to the realism of the show: 
The style of the show can be called hyper-realism […] The Wire – by using 
precise geography, a fully conceptualized city and police bureaucracy, and 
story developments culled from actual casework – should present itself as 
something so clearly real that the traditional concepts of police melodrama 
are seen as such. Nothing should happen on screen that hasn’t in some 
fashion happened on the streets, and the show will utilize a series of veteran 
detectives and Baltimore street figures for story lines and technical assistance. 
(Simon 2000: 2)
That The Wire was extremely successful in achieving its stated ambition of 
“presenting itself as clearly real” is of little doubt, and that it was precisely 
this perceived realism that attracted and elicited virtually unanimous critical 
and popular acclaim is also a matter of scant debate. But what is less clear, 
and what we propose to examine here, is the question: why do we recognize 
The Wire as real?
This question will be addressed from a somewhat peculiar vantage 
point: the perspective of Robert Brandom’s philosophical project, which will 
be presented here in its neo-pragmatist rationalist guise. The decision to 
employ the work of an analytic philosopher best known for his contributions 
to the field of the philosophy of language to address what is essentially a 
question of the verisimilitude of a work of narrative fiction warrants a few 
explanatory remarks. First, it is important to emphasize that this Brandomian 
reading of The Wire should be interpreted in the context of the realist turn, 
which has significantly marked the last ten years of continental philosophy. 
1 For Simon’s version, see Pearson 2009. For Donnie Andrews’ first person account, 
see Walker 2009.
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The “Speculative Realism” workshop held at Goldsmiths College, London 
in April 2007 is usually regarded as the inaugural event of this turn towards 
realism and away from what was perceived as the idealism of continental 
philosophy at the turn of the twentieth century. What started as a small 
gathering of four then lesser-known philosophers (Ray Brassier, Quentin 
Meillassoux, Iain Hamilton Grant and Graham Harman) has since exploded 
into one of the most significant tendencies in contemporary continental 
philosophy. Of the many divergent lines along which this realist tendency 
developed throughout the years, of particular import for us here is that which 
finds its guiding thread in the work of Wilfrid Sellars, and by extension, that 
of Robert Brandom. The most prominent figures of this strand of thought 
are Ray Brassier, Peter Wolfendale and Reza Negarestani, towards whom 
numerous other philosophers, political theorists, artists and curators have 
gravitated. What binds them is a shared commitment to Sellars’ normative-
rationalist account of knowledge2 and the belief that it contains the resources 
to develop a realist ontology,3 and a Promethean, emancipatory, universalist 
ethics and politics.4 
The present paper pursues this line of thought, and suggests that post-
Sellarsian philosophy has the resources to make an important contribution 
to the domains of art and literary theory, because it provides a new 
philosophical framework in which the classical notions of mimesis in general, 
and verisimilitude in particular, can be reformulated in a way consistent with 
the demands of the aforementioned realist turn in continental philosophy. 
It is not our ambition to elaborate this suggestion into a fully developed 
theoretical account. Instead, we will present a case study on the question 
of the verisimilitude of The Wire as an expression of the viability of such a 
project. The choice of subject matter stems from the hypothesis that The 
Wire’s perceived realism is a result of its rationalism. By the same token, 
the choice of Robert Brandom’s work as the interpretative framework is 
dictated by the singular significance his project has to the post-Sellarsian 
2 Sellars’ crucial formulation regarding knowledge can be found in his seminal work 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, in which he famously claims: “in characterizing an 
episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode 
or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify 
what one says” (Sellars 1956: 169).
3 See Brassier 2011; Wolfendale 2010; Ralón 2016.
4 See Brassier 2014; Wolfendale 2017 and 2018; Negarestani 2014; Srnicek and 
Williams 2015.
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philosophical landscape as a whole, and for our present case study in 
particular. Brandom’s impressive oeuvre represents arguably the most 
systematic development of Sellars’ normative account of thought and 
knowledge. In light of this, Brandom’s project is best described as neo-
pragmatist rationalism. It is to be considered a form of rationalism because it 
affirms reasoning as the defining trait of the human mind. And to the extent 
that Brandom construes reasoning in terms of a normative, social, linguistic 
or discursive practice, his rationalism is to be considered neo-pragmatist in 
nature (Sachs 2014: 72–73). 
To elaborate on this in order to understand how realism (albeit of a 
deflationary kind [see Wolfendale 2010]) follows from such a neo-pragmatist 
rationalism, it is necessary to become acquainted with Brandom’s treatment 
of the age-old philosophical problem of the relation between appearance 
and reality. The first part of the paper will therefore consist of a close 
reading of Part One of Brandom’s book Reason in Philosophy (2009), which 
is entitled “Animating Ideas of Idealism: A Semantic Sonata in Kant 
and Hegel,” wherein Brandom articulates his philosophical project as a 
discussion of the appearance/reality distinction. Interestingly, Brandom 
addresses this problem from a historical perspective, through engagement 
with some of the greatest figures from the history of philosophy, such as 
Descartes, Kant and Hegel. If, as Sellars famously claims, the history of 
philosophy is indeed the lingua franca of philosophy (Sellars 1967: 1), then 
this text constitutes the best possible introduction to Brandom’s complex 
philosophical system, especially for the continentals, who might find the 
analytical jargon of Brandom’s other works off-putting and impenetrable. 
Admittedly, this might be a double-edged sword, for Brandom’s readings 
of the history of philosophy could easily be found wanting from a strictly 
exegetical-historical perspective; his treatment of historical figures is highly 
selective, he cites the sources of his claims sparsely, and he barely mentions 
any secondary literature.5 By the same token, our presentation of Brandom’s 
ideas might be found wanting for a similar reason: namely for not engaging 
critically with Brandom’s readings of these historical greats. It should be 
emphasized in this regard that the aim of the first part of the paper is not 
to engage critically with Brandom, but merely to present his account of the 
appearance/reality distinction as consistently as possible, and to introduce 
the reader to Brandom’s thought in an accessible manner. The second part 
5 For Brandom’s justification of his methodology regarding his readings of the history 
of philosophy, see Brandom 2002: 90–120.
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of the paper will use the resources developed in the first part to address the 
problem of the verisimilitude of The Wire.
BRANDOM (WITH KANT AND HEGEL) ON 
REPRESENTATION
According to Robert Brandom (2009: 27–28), the history of philosophy is 
divided in two regarding the problem of the relation between appearance 
and reality. While the premodern world conceived of this relation in terms 
of resemblance (to be an appearance of something is to share properties with 
the thing in question), Descartes’ inauguration of philosophical modernity 
came about through his realization of the inadequacy of this model. The 
Copernican revolution made this obvious: the reality of the Earth rotating 
around the Sun is nothing like the appearance of the Sun revolving around 
the Earth. Descartes saw clearly that if philosophy were to respond to the 
challenges put forth by the new sciences, it was paramount to reconceive 
the appearance/reality distinction. Instead of thinking of this distinction in 
terms of resemblance, a more abstract concept of representation would be 
necessary. And, as Brandom pithily concludes, “we’ve been worrying about 
it ever since” (Brandom 2009: 28).
The model of representation devised by Descartes had two major 
consequences. First, representation was to be conceived in holistic terms: 
contrary to the traditional notion of resemblance, which was local and 
atomistic (i.e. concerned only with “the intrinsic properties of the item 
itself”), Descartes showed that understanding the representational properties 
of an item was only possible by taking into consideration the “whole 
structured system of representings” to which it belonged (Brandom 2002: 
25–26). From this follows the second consequence: vertical relations 
between representings and representeds (thoughts and things) were to be 
understood in terms of horizontal relations between representings and other 
representings, or thoughts and other thoughts (Brandom 2002: 25–26). 
Following in Descartes’ footsteps, Kant acknowledges the centrality of 
these two insights to any account of representation. But while Descartes 
focused his attention on the epistemological problem of representational 
success (how an idea can count as a successful representation of a thing), Kant 
realized that a more fundamental question must be addressed first. This is 
the semantic question of intentionality or representational purport: “What 
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is it … for our ideas so much as to seem to be about something? What is it 
for us to take or treat them as, for them to show up to us as, representings, 
in the sense of something that answers for its correctness to what thereby 
counts as being represented?” (Brandom 2009: 29). 
Kant’s answer to this question is based upon his normative conception 
of the mind. Instead of thinking of the distinction between minded and 
unminded creatures in ontological terms (the minded being defined by the 
presence of a special kind of substance: res cogitans or mental substance), 
as Descartes does, Kant conceives of it in normative deontological terms: 
“what distinguishes judging and intentional doing from the activities of 
non-sapient creatures is not that they involve some special sort of mental 
processes, but that they are things knowers and agents are in a distinctive 
way responsible for” (Brandom 2009: 32). To endorse a judgment is to 
undertake a commitment as to how things are. The content of a judgment, 
or what one is committed to, is determined by the concepts applied therein. 
Given that for Kant, concepts are rules that specify how something ought 
to be done (Brandom 1994: 8), by applying a concept in a judgment, we are 
binding ourselves by norms and therefore making ourselves susceptible to 
normative assessment as to the correctness of our claims. This is why, for Kant, 
“discursive, concept-mongering creatures” are rule-governed, “normative 
creatures – creatures who live and move and have their being in a normative 
space” (Brandom 2009: 33). Contrary to Descartes, who considered our grip 
on concepts to be of central import, Kant puts at the forefront of his (and 
our) philosophical interests the grip that concepts have on us: “the most 
urgent philosophical task is to understand the nature of this normativity, 
the bindingness or validity […] of conceptual norms” (Brandom 2009: 33). 
Given that judgment is the minimal unit for which we can be cognitively 
responsible and committed to, Kant considers judgment as a whole to be 
the basic unit of cognition and experience. Consequently, concepts are to 
be understood only in terms of the role they have in a given judgment. 
With regard to the form of judgment, Kant distinguishes its subjective 
and objective aspects. The subjective form of judgment (the “I think” or 
the emptiest of the representations that can accompany all our judgments) 
reveals who is responsible for the judgment; that is, it “indicates the relation of 
judging to ‘the original synthetic unity of apperception’ to which it belongs” 
(Brandom 2009: 34). The objective form of judgment (“the object=X”), on 
the other hand, expresses the objectivity or intentionality of judgments: 
the fact that every judgment represents, or is about, something. That is, it 
indicates what one has made oneself responsible to by endorsing a judgment 
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(Brandom 2009: 34). As previously stated, by endorsing a judgment we make 
ourselves susceptible to normative appraisal regarding the correctness of 
our claims. The object of judgment exercises a special authority over the 
correctness of our claims. Therefore, Brandom concludes, “representational 
purport is a normative phenomenon”, and “representational content is to be 
understood in terms of it” (Brandom 2009: 35). 
To pursue this line of thought, two related questions need to be 
addressed: 1) “What is it that one makes oneself responsible for by judging?”; 
and 2) “What is it that one is doing in making oneself responsible, committing 
oneself, endorsing?” (Brandom 2009: 35). The second question is crucial 
here, because its answer holds the key to all the questions posed previously: 
what one makes oneself responsible for in judging, what one makes oneself 
responsible to, and finally, who is the subject of these responsibilities. For 
Kant, the responsibility undertaken in endorsing a judgment is “generically a 
kind of task responsibility: a responsibility to do something”; and “specifically, 
it is the responsibility to integrate the judgment into a unity of apperception” 
(Brandom 2009: 35). The synthetic unity of apperception (a self or a 
subject) is nothing but a whole, comprising all the various judgments one 
is committed to. In endorsing a judgment, one is responsible for integrating a 
new commitment with the previous ones. This process of integration consists 
of three distinct but interrelated task-responsibilities: a critical one, 
an ampliative one, and a justificatory one. The first responsibility is to 
evaluate critically whether the judgment that one is considering endorsing 
is materially incompatible with one’s previous commitments. Here, one 
is also responsible for relinquishing previously held commitments if, in 
light of the newly acquired judgment, these turn out to be incompatible 
with the new constellation of commitments that has developed as a result 
of this integration process. Second, one’s ampliative responsibility is to 
extract the material inferential consequences from a judgment one has 
committed oneself to, and to acknowledge that one is already implicitly 
committed to them because they follow from the judgment in question. 
Finally, one is responsible for justifying the new commitment “by citing 
prior commitments that inferentially entitle one to those new commitments” 
(Brandom 2009: 36). These three integrative task-responsibilities produce, 
sustain and develop the original synthetic unity of apperception. 
As Brandom emphasizes, this integrative task-responsibility can be 
formulated in another way: by integrating a commitment into a synthetic unity 
of apperception, one is responsible for “having reasons for one’s endorsements, 
using the contents one endorses as reasons for and against the endorsement 
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of other contents, and taking into account possible countervailing reasons” 
(Brandom 2009: 38). In other words, insofar as we are “normative creatures, we 
are rational creatures”; regardless of whether we have valid reasons for thinking 
and acting as we do, “we are the kind of creatures that we are – knowers 
and agents, creatures whose world is structured by the commitments and 
responsibilities we undertake – only because we are always liable to normative 
assessments of our reasons” (Brandom 2009: 38).
In light of this, we will return to some of the questions raised previously. 
As mentioned, the content of a judgment, or what we are responsible for and 
committed to, is determined by the concepts applied in judging. Kant talks 
about concepts in terms of rules or norms that determine how something 
ought to be done. Now that we have a better grasp of what we are responsible 
for doing in endorsing a judgment, we can give a more precise answer to the 
question of what concepts are rules for doing: they are rules for “synthesizing 
the unity of apperception”; i.e., rules “articulating what is a reason for what” 
(Brandom 2009: 39). Furthermore, concepts determine “what follows from a 
given claim(able), hence what (else) one would have committed oneself to or 
made responsible for by endorsing it”, and “what counts as rational evidence 
for or against, or justification of a judgeable content, hence what would count 
as a reason for or against endorsing it” (Brandom 2009: 39). Finally, concepts 
articulate the content of a judgment by “specifying the material inferential 
and incompatibility relations” that the content of a given judgment stands 
in to the contents of other judgments (Brandom 2009: 39). Therefore, for 
Kant, the conceptual content of a judgment is also to be explained in terms of 
the activity of synthesizing the unity of apperception.
What remains to be seen is how the two dimensions of conceptual 
content—what we are responsible for and what we are responsible to 
in making a judgment—are related to each other. In order to pose this 
problem more precisely, Brandom introduces a further distinction between 
two types of intentionality: the representational “of”-intentionality refers 
to the idea that our thoughts are semantically directed at objects, i.e., 
what we are thinking of or about; while the expressive “that”-intentionality 
refers to the content of our thoughts, or to what we are thinking about 
an object (Brandom 2009: 42). The challenge now is to understand the 
representational “of”-intentionality, or what we are responsible to in a 
judgment, in terms of the expressive “that”-intentionality, or what we are 
responsible for in a judgment. Brandom’s answer lies in acknowledging 
the fact that the expressive “that”-intentionality already implies the 
representational “of”-intentionality:
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The relations of material incompatibility and inferential consequence 
among judgeable contents that we have seen are a necessary condition of 
synthesizing a rational unity of apperception (which is to say judging) already 
implicitly involve commitments concerning the identity and individuation 
of objects they can accordingly be understood as representing or being about. 
(Brandom 2009: 43)
For Brandom, taking two judgments to be materially incompatible with 
one another is taking them to refer to or represent the same object. It is 
impossible for one object to exhibit two materially incompatible judgments. 
By the same token, drawing a material inferential consequence from one 
judgment to the other is taking both judgments to refer to the same object 
(Brandom 2009: 43–44). Therefore, by making ourselves responsible for 
a judgment, we make ourselves responsible to the object of that judgment 
(Brandom 2009: 44–45).
This brings us to the solution of the problem of representational purport, 
with which we started this investigation into the nature of representation: 
“what is it for something so much as to seem to be a representation (a 
representing of something represented)? What does one have to do to count 
as taking or treating it as a representing of something?” (Brandom 2009: 
45) Brandom’s answer to this question should be familiar by now: “treating 
something as standing in relations of material incompatibility and inferential 
consequence to other such things is taking or treating it as a representation, 
as being about something” (Brandom 2009: 45). Insofar as it construes the 
vertical relations between representings and representeds in terms of the 
horizontal relations between representings and other representings, this way 
of solving the problem of representational purport clearly fulfills Descartes’ 
requirements for a holistic account of representation. By formulating his 
account of representation in holistic terms, Kant clearly follows in Descartes’ 
footsteps. But where Kant departs from Descartes, as we have seen, is in 
construing the mind not in ontological but in normative, deontological 
terms. Understanding Kant’s views on normativity is thus paramount if we 
are to have a complete grasp of his account of representation. 
Kant’s normative turn in philosophy revolves around his conception 
of freedom. Freedom, for Kant, is not to be conceived in negative, but 
in positive terms: not as freedom from a constraint, but as freedom to do 
something (Brandom 2009: 58). Specifically, this positive freedom consists in 
“the rational capacity to adopt normative statuses: the ability to commit oneself, 
the authority to make oneself responsible” (Brandom 2009: 59). Therefore, 
instead of being opposed to constraint, freedom, according to Kant, is to 
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be construed precisely as the capacity to constrain or bind ourselves by the 
norms of rationality. Kant’s conception of positive freedom is based upon 
the Enlightenment idea of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses. 
Normative statuses such as commitment, responsibility, and authority 
are dependent upon and instituted by the attitudes of the subjects of such 
statuses. Without human beings adopting normative attitudes towards one 
another, there would be no normative statuses. That is, without people 
taking or treating each other as committed, responsible and authoritative, 
there would be no commitment, responsibility, or authority (Brandom 
2009: 61).
Kant’s idea of autonomy is a direct result of this Enlightenment idea 
of the attitude-dependence of normative statuses: “we, as subjects, are 
genuinely normatively constrained only by rules we constrain ourselves by, 
those that we adopt and acknowledge as binding on us” (Brandom 2009: 62). 
Therefore, only we have the authority to bind or constrain ourselves, and 
we do so by acknowledging certain norms as binding us. Positive freedom, 
for Kant, consists precisely of “our authority to make ourselves rationally 
responsible by taking ourselves to be responsible” (Brandom 2009: 63). 
According to Kant’s model of autonomy, it is up to us whether we are bound 
by a particular norm. But if we are to consider ourselves to be truly bound 
by the norm in question, the content of that norm, or what we are bound 
by, surely cannot be up to us. For if it were up to us to determine right and 
wrong with regard to a norm that we acknowledge as binding us, then, as 
Wittgentsein’s private language argument states, “whatever seems right 
to us would be right” (Brandom 2009: 64). It would then be impossible to 
establish the very distinction that determines the content of a norm, i.e. the 
distinction between what is correct and what is incorrect according to the 
norm in question. If the notion of normative constraint is to be intelligible, 
normative force (the fact that we are bound by a certain norm) and the 
content of the norm in question (what the norm involves, what it prescribes 
as correct or incorrect) should have relative independence.
Tension clearly exists between Kant’s autonomy model, with its 
commitment to the attitude-dependence of normative statuses, on the one 
hand, and the requirement for the relative attitude-independence of the 
content of the norms by which the autonomous subjects bind themselves, 
on the other. While the subject has the authority over the act of judging 
(i.e., over deciding which concepts to apply in a judgment), the content of 
the concepts applied (i.e., what the subject becomes responsible for) must 
be independent from the subject’s act of judging, or taking of responsibility. 
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Or, the content of the judgment itself “must have an authority that is 
independent of the responsibility that the judger takes for it” (Brandom 2009: 
67). But if authority is a normative status, and therefore attitude-dependent, 
the question now becomes “Whose attitudes is the authority of conceptual 
contents dependent on?” (Brandom 2009: 67) Given the requirement for 
the relative independence of normative force and normative content, Kant’s 
autonomy model cannot provide the answer. For, as the latter has it, the 
authority of conceptual content must be dependent on the attitude of the 
one taking responsibility for the content in question, which is precisely 
what the former precludes. 
In Brandom’s reading, Hegel’s social model of reciprocal recognition was 
designed with the intent to resolve this tension (Brandom 2009: 68). Hegel 
accepts the Enlightenment idea of the attitude-dependence of normative 
statuses, and acknowledges the merits of Kant’s autonomy model: normative 
statuses are dependent upon the attitudes of those who are their subjects. 
But Hegel disagrees with Kant in relation to the nature of this dependence. 
Contrary to Kant, Hegel considers the attitudes of the subjects of normative 
statuses as necessary but not sufficient conditions of the normative statuses in 
question. Hegel’s crucial advance over Kant lies in his insight that normative 
statuses, such as authority and responsibility, are essentially social phenomena. 
Authority and responsibility are the result of the attitudes of not only the 
subjects of these normative statuses, but also of others who hold or acknowledge 
them as such. “Taking someone to be responsible or authoritative, attributing 
a normative deontic attitude to someone, is the attitude-kind that Hegel 
(picking up a term of Fichte’s) calls ‘recognition’ (Anerkennung)” (Brandom 
2009: 70). It is only by considering the attitudes of those who recognize 
someone as authoritative or responsible, and those who are recognized as such, 
together, that we arrive at the necessary and sufficient conditions for instituting 
normative statuses. Therefore, according to Hegel, normative statuses are 
instituted by a social process of reciprocal recognition:
Someone becomes responsible only when others hold him responsible, and 
exercises authority only when others acknowledge that authority. One has 
the authority to petition others for recognition, in an attempt to become 
responsible or authoritative. To do that, one must recognize others as able 
to hold one responsible or acknowledge one’s authority. This is according 
those others a certain kind of authority. To achieve such statuses, one must 
be recognized by them in turn. That is to make oneself in a certain sense 
responsible to them. But they have that authority only insofar as one grants 
it to them by recognizing them as authoritative. (Brandom 2009: 70) 
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The same social process of reciprocal recognition synthesizes “a normative 
recognitive community of those recognized by and who recognize the 
normative subject: a community bound together by reciprocal relations 
of authority over and responsibility to each other” (Brandom 2009: 70). It 
is only by being recognized as a fully-fledged member of this normative 
recognitive community that one becomes a normative subject. But this 
community itself is composed only of the attitudes of those who reciprocally 
recognize each other as its members. 
Let us return to the previously posed question of the relative indepen-
dence of normative force and content. As we have seen, if this requirement 
is to be fulfilled, the content of a commitment (or what a subject is respon-
sible for) has to be independent of the subject’s act of committing himself 
or making himself responsible. Hegel’s social reciprocal recognitive model 
of normative bindingness shows how this is possible. By granting authority 
over the content of the commitment not to the one committing himself, but 
to others, to those to whom the subject makes himself responsible, Hegel 
affirms both the attitude-dependence of normative statuses and the relative 
independence of normative force and content. The content of the commi-
tment is independent of the attitudes of the one taking responsibility, yet 
at the same time is dependent on the attitudes of those towards whom the 
person undertaking a commitment takes responsibility. 
By applying a concept in a judgment we exercise our authority over the 
act of judging: we decide which concepts to apply. But we do not have the 
authority to determine the content of the concept applied; only the social 
recognitive community of which we are members has this authority. We 
will now turn to the question of how conceptual content is determined.
For Kant, the process of determining conceptual contents is to be 
conceived of as prior to and distinct from the act of judging. In fact, to 
him the existence of fully determinate conceptual contents constitutes the 
conditions of possibility of judgment itself. If we are to apply a concept 
in a judgment, surely the content of that concept must be determined in 
advance. Following Quine’s objection to Carnap’s similar two-stage account, 
Brandom highlights the difficulty of such a position. While in formulating 
artificial languages it is not only possible but necessary to define the meaning 
of an expression prior to its use, this procedure clearly cannot be appropriate 
when dealing with natural languages. For in the latter case, only our use of 
a particular expression can fix its meaning (Brandom 2009: 83).
Hegel was among the first philosophers to acknowledge this. Contrary to 
Kant, who uncritically assumed the content of a concept as given (i.e. always 
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already available to applying a concept in a judgment), Hegel insists that the 
practice of applying concepts in judgment is at the same time the practice 
of determining conceptual contents. From this it follows—again contra 
Kant who postulated conceptual contents as completely and definitively 
determined in advance of applying a concept in a judgment—that the process 
of determining conceptual concepts can never be fully completed. For 
without a prior explicit definition of a concept, only the prior applications 
of that concept in actual judgments can determine its contents. Given that 
prior uses of a concept cannot settle in advance whether the concept in 
question ought to be applied in new circumstances, the content of that 
concept can never be fully determined (Brandom 2009: 89).
To consider this open-ended process of determining conceptual contents 
by the application of concepts (both actual prior and possible future ones), 
we need a new conception of determinateness that is able to account for both 
the retrospective and prospective aspects of this process. Hegel develops just 
such a temporal and perspectival conception of determinateness under the 
name Vernunft, so as to better distinguish it from Kant’s static conception, 
to which he refers as Verstand (Brandom 2009: 89). As we have seen, for 
Kant, to apply a concept in a judgment is to undertake a commitment. In 
committing, we make ourselves responsible for the rational integration of 
this new commitment into a whole that consists of all our previously held 
commitments, which is the synthetic unity of apperception. This Kantian 
model of judgment, based on the Verstand conception of determinateness, 
assumes the conceptual contents of our commitments as given, and is 
therefore only concerned with the prospective dimension of the process, that 
is, with rationally integrating our new commitments with the previous ones. 
Hegel takes up this Kantian model of judgment as rational integration, but 
adds to it a retrospective dimension: by applying a concept in a judgment we 
are responsible not only to rationally integrate the new commitment with 
our previous ones, but also to rationally reconstruct the developmental process 
by which we arrived at our current set of commitments. That is, we have to 
show that our current set of commitments forms a rational unity, and that the 
process by which we acquired them was also rational. Hegel calls this process 
of rational reconstruction recollection (Erinnerung) (Brandom 2009: 90). By 
reinscribing this process in terms of Hegel’s model of reciprocal recognition, 
Brandom argues that while in rationally integrating a commitment we are 
“taking a responsibility, making a commitment, by petitioning future concept 
users to be recognized”, in recollecting we are  “asserting authority, vindicating 
an entitlement, by recognizing past concept users” (Brandom 2009: 91). 
274
M. J e l a č a, From Rationalism to Realism in The Wire (261–290)
“Umjetnost riječi” LX (2016) • 3–4 • Zagreb • July – December
Exercising authority over past applications of concepts by rationally 
reconstructing the process that led to our current commitments, and 
undertaking a responsibility to rationally integrate the new applications of 
concepts with previous commitments, are two complementary perspectival 
aspects of the unitary process of determining conceptual contents by the 
application of concepts. Hegel’s Vernunft conception of determinateness is 
supposed to explicate this. The retrospective aspect of the process consists 
of recollective reconstruction, by which we turn the past applications of 
concepts, which might seem contingent and irrational at first, into a history 
or tradition of our current set of commitments, which exhibit a necessary 
and rational developmental structure. We do so by discovering the norms 
that were implicit in our practices all along. It is precisely by finding out what 
the real boundaries of our current concepts are (i.e. what really follows from 
what, and what is incompatible with what), that we can be said to determine 
their conceptual contents (Brandom 2009: 92).
The prospective aspect of the process of determining conceptual contents 
consists of the rational integration of new commitments with previous ones. 
With every new application of a concept to novel particulars, we can be said 
to further determine the content of the concept in question by “drawing new, 
more definite boundaries where many possibilities existed before” (Brandom 
2009: 93). When we apply a concept to an object, we undertake a commitment 
as to how things are: that is, we take our application of the concept to be 
correct. Given that every application of a concept is based on prior uses of 
the concept in question, we are thereby exercising our authority over those 
past applications. But, as Hegel’s model of reciprocal recognition has it, we 
are simultaneously making ourselves responsible to the concept we apply. 
By applying a concept and by taking it to be correct, we grant authority to 
future users of the concept to judge whether our application was correct. It 
is only if our use of a concept has been recognized as correct by subsequent 
rational reconstructions of its conceptual contents that we can be certain our 
rational integration of new commitments with previous ones has succeeded.
Finally, we have at our disposal the resources necessary to address the 
problem with which we opened our discussion—that of the relation of 
appearance and reality. In Brandom’s pragmatist reading of Hegel, this 
problem takes the following form: 
what do we have to do thereby to be taking or treating the conceptual contents 
(senses), which we understand by grasping their material consequential and 
incompatibility relations to one another, as subjective appearances of some 
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underlying objective reality to which they answer for their correctness as 
appearances of it? (Brandom 2009: 99)
Hegel’s answer is based on a crucial insight: “the idea of noumena, of 
things as they are in themselves, the reality that appears in the form of 
phenomena, can be understood practically in terms of a distinctive role in a 
recollectively rationally reconstructed historical sequence of phenomena” 
(Brandom 2009: 99). To elaborate: in making a judgment we are undertaking 
a commitment as to how things are. In doing so, we make ourselves 
responsible for rationally integrating this new commitment into the whole 
of our previous commitments. According to Hegel, it is only when this latest 
rational integration of a new commitment is accompanied by a rational 
reconstruction—which shows how the process that led to our current 
constellation of commitments was expressively progressive—that we can claim 
that this new commitment is a commitment to how things really are. It is 
not only an appearance of reality, but a veridical appearance, in which things 
appear as they are (Brandom 2009: 100). If our rational reconstruction of the 
history of our current set of commitments is to be expressively progressive, 
it must satisfy two requirements. First, it has to show how each of our 
prior sets of commitments progressed towards our current constellation of 
commitments. And second, it has to construe this progressive process as 
gradual making explicit what can be seen retrospectively as having been 
implicit all along (Brandom 2009: 100). Therefore, Brandom concludes: “In 
taking our current set of commitments as the standard to judge what counts 
as expressive progress, one is taking them as the reality of which previous 
constellations of endorsements were ever more complete and accurate 
appearances” (Brandom 2009: 100). 
By retrospectively tracing an expressively progressive trajectory through 
past rational integrations, we exercise our authority over the activity of 
those who performed them. It is up to us to decide which of these past 
integrations should be recognized as correct and progressive, and which 
should be discarded. But given that the only rationale for our current 
rational integration and recollection is provided precisely by those previous 
integrations, we are at the same time responsible to them. It is not up to us to 
decide whether our latest rational integration and recollection have been 
successful. Only the future rational integrators and recollectors have this 
authority, and they get to decide whether we have fulfilled our responsibility 
towards the past tradition, and hence deserve to be recognized as expressively 
progressive with respect to it. “This structure of reciprocal authority and 
responsibility is the historical form of recognition, which institutes at once 
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both a distinctive form of community (a tradition) and individuals exhibiting 
determinately conceptually contentful normative statuses: commitments 
representing how things objectively are” (Brandom 2009: 103).
FROM RATIONALISM…
Having acquainted ourselves with Brandom’s neo-pragmatist rationalist 
account of the relation between appearance and reality, we can now use 
these newly acquired conceptual tools to address the central question of 
this paper: why do we recognize The Wire as real?
The most facile and tempting answer is to claim that the verisimilitude 
of The Wire stems from the construction of the world it creates being so 
deeply rooted in the real world that it purportedly depicts, to the extent 
that it is virtually impossible to tell where reality ends and fiction begins. 
The factual research that went into the writing of the show is awe inspiring, 
and the real world of the city of Baltimore is inextricably intertwined with 
the fictional world of The Wire. Not only are most of the show’s main 
characters composites of real people, but some of those who were inspiration 
for characters also played minor roles in it.6 Furthermore, most storylines 
and narrative sequences are based on real life events, documented in actual 
police casework, journalistic reporting, or anecdotal experience. Finally, the 
language of the show is so faithful to the vernacular of the groups depicted 
that it presents a serious challenge to anyone who is not a Baltimore native, 
and probably even to some who are. 
David Simon is unambiguous about his ambitions regarding the 
verisimilitude of his writing in general, and The Wire in particular:
Beginning with Homicide, the book, I decided to write for the people living 
the event, the people in that very world. [...] I also realized—and this was 
more important to me—that I would consider the book or film a failure 
if people in these worlds took in my story and felt that I did not get their 
existence, that I had not captured their world in any way that they would 
respect. [...] In terms of dialogue, vernacular, description, tone—I want a 
6 The most notable appearances are by Donnie Andrews (the real life Omar Little, 
who plays Omar’s associate in the show), and Melvin Williams (one of Baltimore’s major 
drug dealers from the 1970s and 80s, who was the inspiration for the character of Avon 
Barksdale), who plays The Deacon.
277
M. J e l a č a, From Rationalism to Realism in The Wire (261–290)
“Umjetnost riječi” LX (2016) • 3–4 • Zagreb • July – December
homicide detective, or a drug slinger, or a longshoreman, or a politician 
anywhere in America to sit up and say, Whoa, that’s how my day is. (Simon 
qtd. in Alvarez 2009: 394)
Sure enough, countless testimonies from people belonging to these social 
groups confirm Simon’s success in portraying them as authentically as 
possible.7 Given this, we might be excused for concluding that we recognize 
The Wire as real for the simple reason that, for the most part, it is real, or at 
least as real as any investigative journalism or documentary can be. But an 
obvious rejoinder springs immediately to mind: although diverse groups of 
people depicted by the show (police officers, drug dealers, longshoremen, 
teachers, politicians) recognize themselves in its characters, what about the 
rest of us? Why have we almost unanimously recognized The Wire as one 
of the most (if not the most) realistic works of narrative fiction around? 
Simon attempts to explain this:  “Well, here’s a secret that I learned with 
Homicide and have held to: if you write something that is so credible that 
the insider will stay with you, then the outsider will follow as well” (Simon 
qtd. in Alvarez 2009: 394). But Simon’s claim merely begs the question: 
what is it that makes a piece of fiction so credible to the insider? 
Brandom’s account of the appearance/reality distinction teaches us why 
this and any similar attempts to answer the question of the verisimilitude of 
The Wire are essentially flawed: they all assume that the distinction between 
appearance and reality is to be conceived in terms of resemblance. That is, 
they all presuppose that if this is a veridical appearance, The Wire has to 
be in some sense similar to the reality it purports to represent. The Wire 
does indeed resemble the real world, but this is not enough to explain its 
purported realism. Rather, it is necessary to address the question of the 
verisimilitude of The Wire in terms of representation.8 
As we have learned from Brandom, while resemblance is local and 
atomistic—i.e. concerned only with the relation between that which denotes 
and the denoted object—the notion of representation is to be conceived in 
holistic terms. The representational properties of an item can only be made 
7 Of the many testimonies found online, the most famous is that containing the opinions 
of real drug dealers (see Venkatesh 2008).
8 Here, a general remark on the notion of mimesis is in order: while it could be argued 
that the premodern world conceived of mimesis in terms of resemblance, it would be a mistake 
to conflate our rejection of resemblance with the rejection of mimesis. Instead, as suggested 
in the Introduction, a potential task for Brandomian aesthetics today could be to reconceive 
the notion of mimesis in terms of Brandom’s account of representation.
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sense of in the context of the whole structured system of representings to which 
it belongs, implying that the vertical relation between a representing and a 
represented are to be conceived in terms of the horizontal relations between 
a representing and the other representings with which it forms a system. This 
means that if we conceive of The Wire in terms of representation and not 
resemblance, we must first stop enquiring as to whether a certain character 
or narrative sequence has a real life counterpart. Instead, we must examine 
the role of each single element of The Wire in the show as a whole. To make 
this claim more specific, we will proceed further in Brandom’s footsteps.
Brandom makes an important distinction between the notions of 
representational purport and representational success. Before we can address 
the problem of the representational success of a particular representing 
(what is it for an idea to count as a successful representation of a thing), we 
must first answer the question of representational purport (what is it for 
an idea to even seem to be about something). The same holds true for The 
Wire. If we are to explain why we recognize it to be real, that is, why we 
recognize it to be a successful representation of the real, we must first answer 
the question of the representational purport of the show: why does it seem 
to us that The Wire is about the real? After all, however realistic it might 
seem it is still a work of fiction. Brandom’s answer to these questions 
is based upon his normative-deontological conception of the mind. By 
endorsing a claim, we undertake a commitment as to how things are. In 
doing so we make ourselves responsible for rationally integrating this 
new commitment into the synthetic unity of apperception that comprises 
our previous commitments. The responsibility to rationally integrate a 
new commitment into the constellation of those already held consists of 
critical, ampliative, and justificatory task responsibilities. In short: we are 
first responsible for critically evaluating whether the new commitment is 
materially incompatible with the rest of our commitments; then we are 
responsible for extracting the material inferential consequences of endorsing 
this new commitment; and finally we are responsible for justifying our new 
commitment by citing those among our prior commitments that inferentially 
entitle us to it. Brandom’s answer to the question of representational purport 
follows from this: by treating something as standing in relations of material 
incompatibility and inferential consequence to other such things, we take it to 
be a representation of something. 
The Wire as a whole is a complex structure, composed of numerous 
commitments as to how things are. Following Brandom’s lead, this is our 
first contention: by taking all the commitments that The Wire endorses 
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as standing in relations of material incompatibility and inferential consequence 
to one another, we take each of these commitments, and consequently The 
Wire as a whole, to be a representation. In other words, we treat The Wire 
as a representation not because we suppose it to be rooted in meticulous 
research of the real world, but because of its utmost commitment to rational 
consistency. Virtually every commitment of The Wire is either justified, 
discarded for being incompatible with other commitments, or has its 
consequences drawn out over the course of the show’s five seasons. This 
is without a doubt The Wire’s most impressive aspect. Consequently, our 
answer to the question of the representational purport of The Wire could 
be formulated thus: The Wire seems real because it is rational. 
The rationalism of The Wire manifests on several levels. First, as already 
adumbrated, it is most obvious and insistent in the show’s commitment to 
rationally integrate its elements into a unified whole. Aristotle was the first 
to recognize that every element of a poetic work of art has to be presented 
as either “probable or necessary” (Aristotle 2001: 1463). Following this, 
Boris Tomashevski put forward a similar requirement: every motif must be 
justified in such a way that its introduction seems necessary to the reader/
viewer. Finally, Roland Barthes states this idea even more forcefully: 
everything in a narrative has a function and a meaning (Barthes 1975: 245). 
Art, according to Barthes, is “a pure system: there are no wasted units, and 
there can never be any, however long, loose, or tenuous the threads which 
link them to one of the levels of the story” (Barthes 1975: 245).9 
If ever a work of narrative fiction fulfilled these requirements almost 
perfectly, it is certainly The Wire; virtually any scene could be chosen to 
confirm this. We will take as our example the most famous, and arguably 
most important scene of the whole show, in which D’Angelo Barksdale 
tries to teach Bodie and Wallace the rules of chess. At the beginning of 
the episode “The Buys” (S01E03), D’Angelo walks in on Wallace and 
Bodie playing checkers with a chess set. He immediately realizes that the 
main reason they are doing this is that they don’t know how to play chess. 
D’Angelo sits down to teach them how to play this “better game”. While 
9 To explain further: bringing these three important historical figures into a single 
genealogical line is not meant to erase the many important differences in their respective 
accounts of verisimilitude. Instead, it is intended to foreground what they have in common: 
an insistence on the centrality of necessity to any notion of verisimilitude. It is precisely in the 
notion of necessity—construed as the necessary condition of any account of rationality—that 
the link to Brandom’s neo-pragmatist rationalist project is found.
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Bodie is reluctant to learn at first, Wallace seems eager. But Bodie is first 
to interpret the rules of chess in terms of another game, one he knows well: 
the drug trade. In this game, Avon Barksdale is the kingpin, Stringer Bell 
is his Queen, the drug stash is the castle, and the innumerable corner kids 
(“young’uns” or “hoppers”) are the pawns (“them little baldheaded bitches”). 
No sooner do they learn the basic figures than the boys want to know how 
one gets to be king. D’Angelo’s answer is telling: “It ain’t like that. See, 
the king stay the king, a’ight? Everything stay who he is. Except for the 
pawns. Now, if the pawn make it all the way down to the other dude’s side, 
he get to be queen. And like I said, the queen ain’t no bitch. She got all the 
moves.” Bodie sees an opportunity and goes for it: “A’ight, so if I make it to 
the other end, I win.” D’Angelo’s answer is far from reassuring: “Nah, yo, 
it ain’t like that. Look, the pawns, man, in the game, they get capped quick. 
They be out the game early.” But Bodie is hardly discouraged: “Unless they 
some smart-ass pawns.”
The brilliance of this scene is matched only by the significance it holds 
for the show as a whole. Its singular import lies in the fact that it makes 
explicit several threads that will guide us through the rest of the show. First, 
it introduces the notion of “The Game”. As already noted, this scene revolves 
around the ambiguous use of the word “game”: while D’Angelo ostensibly 
tries to teach the two young’uns the rules of the game of chess, the lesson 
that Bodie and Wallace learn instead is about the game of the drug trade. 
These two quite different activities fall under the same concept of “game” 
because of their rule-bound nature. The game of the drug trade is subject to 
a set of rules as strict as those that rule the game of chess. But the analogy 
between chess and the drug trade is further reinforced by the proximity of 
the two worlds, constructed by their respective sets of rules. In D’Angelo’s 
terms, in chess, just like in the drug trade “everything stay who he is”. That 
the rules of chess determine conclusively what the figures on the board 
can and cannot do is unsurprising; the striking part of D’Angelo’s analogy 
is his claim that the same applies to the drug trade. In this game too, “the 
king stay the king.” That is, the fate of the figures in “the game” is just as 
predetermined as the fate of the pieces on a chessboard. And no matter how 
“smart-ass” some pawns may turn out to be, they will never get to be king.
In an important interview, David Simon highlights the main ideas 
behind The Wire: 
Much of our modern theater seems rooted in the Shakespearean discovery 
of the modern mind. We’re stealing instead from an earlier, less-traveled 
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construct—the Greeks—lifting our thematic stance wholesale from Aeschylus, 
Sophocles, Euripides to create doomed and fated protagonists who confront a 
rigged game and their own mortality. The modern mind—particularly those 
of us in the West—finds such fatalism ancient and discomfiting, I think. We 
are a pretty self-actualized, self-worshipping crowd of postmoderns and the 
idea that for all of our wherewithal and discretionary income and leisure, 
we’re still fated by indifferent gods, feels to us antiquated and superstitious. 
We don’t accept our gods on such terms anymore; by and large, with the 
exception of the fundamentalists among us, we don’t even grant Yahweh 
himself that kind of unbridled, interventionist authority.
But instead of the old gods, The Wire is a Greek tragedy in which the 
postmodern institutions are the Olympian forces. It’s the police department, 
or the drug economy, or the political structures, or the school administration, 
or the macroeconomic forces that are throwing the lightning bolts and 
hitting people in the ass for no decent reason. In much of television, and in a 
good deal of our stage drama, individuals are often portrayed as rising above 
institutions to achieve catharsis. In this drama, the institutions always prove 
larger, and those characters with hubris enough to challenge the postmodern 
construct of American empire are invariably mocked, marginalized, or 
crushed. Greek tragedy for the new millennium, so to speak. Because so much 
of television is about providing catharsis and redemption and the triumph 
of character, a drama in which postmodern institutions trump individuality 
and morality and justice seems different in some ways, I think. (Simon qtd. 
in Alvarez 2009: 384–385)
The previously described chess scene introduces the viewers to the laws of 
this tragic world of “doomed and fated protagonists who confront a rigged 
game and their own mortality”. While D’Angelo plays the role of the old 
sage, who knows and explains the rules of this tragic game to the uninitiated, 
Bodie intimates that he might just have enough hubris to challenge these 
rules. As it turns out, all three characters from this scene will attempt to 
challenge “the game” in one way or another. And as professed, all three 
will be crushed in the process. 
In the course of his four seasons as a character on the show, Bodie proved 
time and again that he was indeed a “smart-ass pawn”. Of the numerous 
occasions that could be recalled as confirmation of this, the most telling (and 
entertaining) is in a short scene from the final episode of the third season 
(“Mission Accomplished”, S03E12), in which Bodie invokes “contrapment” 
(the correct legal term being “entrapment”) in order to free himself from the 
drug trafficking charges Rhonda Pearlman tries to level against him. And as 
Jimmy McNulty is happy to point out, “the kid has a point”. But far more 
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important, both for the development of The Wire as a whole, and for our 
present purposes, is a scene from the last episode of the fourth season, in 
which Bodie is seen having a conversation over lunch with McNulty, after 
the latter got him released from Central Booking. The scene takes place 
in Northwest Baltimore’s Cylburn Arboretum, which Bodie never even 
knew existed. After making it clear to McNulty that he “ain’t no snitch”, 
Bodie utters some of the most memorable lines of the whole show: “I feel 
old. I been out there since I was thirteen. I ain’t never fucked up a count, 
never stole off a package, never did some shit I wasn’t told to do. I’ve been 
straight up. But what come back? ... They want me to stand with them, right? 
But where the fuck they’re at when they supposed to be standing by us? ... 
This game is rigged, man. We like them little bitches on the chessboard.” 
“Pawns,” McNulty adds. 
Bodie has finally learned the lesson that D’Angelo was trying to teach 
him at the beginning of the first season: the game is rigged. No matter how 
hard you try, or how good a player you are (and, as Bodie is right to recall 
here, he was indeed a great player), your fate is sealed. Interestingly, it was 
precisely this realisation that drove Bodie to try to challenge “the game,” 
as personified by Marlo. But just as D’Angelo foretold, Bodie would be 
“capped” soon after. The next scene in which we encounter Bodie will be 
his last in the show. Gunned down on his corner by Marlo’s assassins, his 
last words are: “Yo, this is my corner! I ain’t going nowhere.” Bodie lived 
and died on the corner, like the “true soldier” (McNulty) that he was.
To echo Barthes, although the thread that links the chess scene with the 
Arboretum scene is neither loose nor tenuous, it is certainly long, spanning 
four seasons of the show. What better way to demonstrate that in The 
Wire there really “are no wasted units,” and that everything has a function 
and a meaning? That this achievement is a result of The Wire’s sustained 
commitment to rationally integrate its elements into a unified whole is further 
reinforced by another famous example. In a scene from the sixth episode 
of the first season titled “The Wire”, detective Lester Freamon scolds his 
young colleague, detective Roland “Prez” Pryzbylewski, for not recognizing 
the pertinence of a phone call the two of them intercepted on the wiretap. In 
trying to teach Prez that every seemingly trivial detail is important for building 
their case, Lester utters the now famous words: “We’re building something 
here detective, we’re building it from scratch. And all the pieces matter”. 
The case that Lester and Prez are building at this point is that against 
Avon Barksdale. But the investigation that starts with the intent to bring 
down the Barksdale organization will eventually lead Lester to much bigger 
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targets. As he states later in the first season: “You follow drugs, you get drug 
addicts and drug dealers. But you start to follow the money, and you don’t 
know where the fuck it’s gonna take you” (S01E09, “Game Day”). The money 
trail will take Lester from the drug addicts and drug dealers all the way up to 
corrupt politicians and property developers. Lester’s attempt at building a case 
against these bigger players will form one of the most important storylines of 
The Wire as a whole. Its significance is that it shows not only the complicity 
between street level criminals and corrupt politicians and businessmen, but 
also, and more importantly, that the drug game is merely a part of a bigger 
game: nothing less than capitalism itself. Therefore, it could be argued that 
in trying to build a case against some of the most influential politicians and 
businessmen of the city of Baltimore, Lester is mounting a case against 
Capital itself, or at least against one node of this all-encompassing network: a 
formidable opponent, indeed. In line with the basic tragic tenet of the show, 
Lester’s challenge will eventually be neutralized and he will be punished for 
his hubris. Luckily for him, Lester won’t be forced into an early grave for his 
sins, but merely into early retirement from the police force. As Ellis Carver 
succinctly states, “They [street level criminals] fuck up, they get beat. We 
fuck up, they give us pensions” (“Sentencing,” S01E13).
Time and again, throughout the show’s five seasons, Lester proves the 
truth of the words he directed at Prez: in building a case, all the pieces matter. 
But if we step outside the world of The Wire, there is another sense in which 
Lester’s famous words can be understood to refer to, and describe the logic 
of the world of The Wire itself. As much as Lester tries to teach Prez about 
building their case, his words can also be taken as trying to teach us, the viewers 
an important lesson about The Wire itself: in the world of The Wire, all the 
pieces matter.10 If we are to comprehend The Wire in all its complexity, we’d 
better start paying close attention to the details, no matter how small and 
insignificant they might seem on the first viewing. Often, these details are 
virtually impossible to catch the first time, which is why watching The Wire 
over and over again is such a rewarding experience. Therefore, our previous 
claim that The Wire is committed to integrating all its elements into a unified 
whole is explicitly confirmed in the words of one of its main characters. 
10 Several cues reinforce this interpretation. First, the words “…and all the pieces 
matter” figure as an epigram for the beginning of the episode entitled “The Wire” (S01E06). 
Second, they are an epigram for David Simon’s “Introduction” to the book The Wire: Truth be 
Told (2009). Finally, Simon explicitly cites them on the audio commentary to the first episode 
of the first season (“The Target”) in the DVD edition of the series, and offers precisely the 
reading we have given here. 
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What remains to be proven, though, is that this integration is supposed 
to be rational. Before we proceed, it is paramount to recall that in Brandom’s 
neo-pragmatist usage of the term, rationality is to be understood in the 
weakest possible sense: as a practice, or, to draw on a famous phrase often 
attributed to Sellars by Brandom, as a “game of giving and asking for reasons”. 
In other words, to be rational is to be able to determine in practice what 
follows from what, and what is a reason for what. Of the myriad examples 
that could be drawn upon to confirm that The Wire is deeply committed to 
a rationality thus defined, the most pertinent to our case is in the opening 
scenes of the episode “Straight and True” (S03E05), featuring Reginald 
“Bubbles” Cousins and his protégé Johnny Weeks. Walking down an alley, 
Bubbles and Johnny engage in the following discussion about “snitching”: 
Johnny: “No, Bubs. I mean there’s gotta be rules, or else things get fucked 
up.” 
Bubbles: “Ain’t no rules with dope fiends.” 
Johnny: “When the police got you shackled up, you make a move, right? 
You help yourself out. But to just start snitching for no reason, that doesn’t 
make no…” 
Bubbles: “Let me track this. You hypopulating that you can tattletale when 
you locked up but you can’t do it straight up for the money? I mean, no 
offence son, but that’s some weak-ass thinking. You equivocating like a 
motherfuck.”
Johnny: “OK, so a snitch is a snitch, right?”
Bubbles: “There you go.”
A perfect example of the game of giving and asking for reasons, if ever there 
was one. The rules of this game are simple: we are responsible for having 
reasons for each claim we make, for providing them if challenged, and for 
taking into account possible countervailing reasons. In other words, we are 
responsible for justifying each claim we make, for relinquishing those claims 
that are materially incompatible with our other claims, and for extracting 
the material inferential consequences of all our claims. Each claim that 
we make is a petition for recognition by our fellow players in the game of 
giving and asking for reasons, and is therefore open to being challenged.
What Johnny fails to realize, and what Bubbles is quick to point out, is 
that by endorsing the first claim, i.e. that it is acceptable to “snitch” in order 
to free oneself from legal prosecution, Johnny has committed himself to 
what follows from this claim—that it is acceptable to “snitch” in exchange 
for money. To put the same point the other way around: Johnny fails to 
realize that these two claims are materially incompatible, and that he ought 
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to renounce one of them. Either it is acceptable to be a “snitch” or it is not, 
regardless of the circumstances. Bubbles, as Johnny’s mentor and fellow 
player in the game of giving and asking for reasons, is there to correct the 
errors of Johnny’s inferential ways, and he does so (quite colorfully) by 
warning Johnny that he is “equivocating like a motherfuck”. As Johnny’s 
first line in this exchange testifies (“No, Bubs. I mean there’s gotta be rules, 
or else things get fucked up”), his error of judgment is to be attributed to his 
desire to abide by the rules of “the (drug) game”: “soldiers” (drug addicts) 
don’t “snitch”. But what Johnny can’t seem to grasp is that, to borrow a 
phrase from Stringer Bell, “there are games beyond the fucking game” 
(“Reformation”, S03E10). And beyond and above them, only one game’s 
rules bind us all: the game of giving and asking for reasons.
…TO REALISM IN THE WIRE
Now that we have elaborated on the rationalism of The Wire, we return to 
the question of its realism. Or, more precisely, after answering the question 
of the representational purport of The Wire, we can now address the question 
of its representational success: why do we recognize The Wire as a veridical 
representation of the real?
Let us first recall Brandom’s answer to the question of representational 
success. According to Brandom’s reading, Hegel’s crucial move in relation to 
Kant’s account of judgment is to add a retrospective dimension: by applying 
a concept in a judgment we are responsible not only to rationally integrate 
the new commitment with previous ones, but also to rationally reconstruct 
the developmental process by which we arrived at our current set of 
commitments. That is, we have to show that our current set of commitments 
forms a rational unity, and that the process by which we acquired them was 
rational too. We do this by making explicit the norms that were implicit in 
our practices, but that governed them all along. Brandom’s answer to the 
question of representational success follows this line of reasoning: a claim 
can be said to be a veridical appearance or a successful representation of 
reality if its rational integration into the whole of our commitments is 
accompanied by a rational reconstruction that shows how the process that 
led to our current constellation of commitments was expressively progressive. 
For this rational reconstruction of our current set of commitments to count 
as expressively progressive it must first show how our prior constellations 
286
M. J e l a č a, From Rationalism to Realism in The Wire (261–290)
“Umjetnost riječi” LX (2016) • 3–4 • Zagreb • July – December
of commitments made progress towards the current one, and then construe 
this progressive process as gradually making explicit what can retrospectively 
be seen as having been implicit all along.  
Following Brandom once again, this is our final contention: we recognize 
The Wire as a veridical appearance of reality precisely because it exhibits an 
expressively progressive structure, which culminates in the final constellation 
of commitments endorsed by the show, and gradually makes explicit these 
commitments, which can retrospectively be seen as having been implicit 
throughout its five seasons. In this way, The Wire not only rationally integrates 
all its commitments into a unified whole, but also rationally vindicates the 
process by which it gradually came to endorse these commitments, i.e., to 
show that this process was rational as well, thereby fulfilling Brandom’s 
requirement for successful representation.
The question at this point is: what is the constellation of commitments 
in which The Wire culminates? But if we are to establish the show’s end 
point, surely we must first determine its starting point. In other words, to 
establish the claim that The Wire endorses by its end, we must first determine 
the problem to which this claim responds.
If, as stated above, The Wire is to be seen as expressively progressive—
that is, as both progressing towards a final set of commitments and gradually 
making them explicit—then both the problem and the solution are present 
in an implicit form from the show’s beginning. Although it would be 
interesting to identify and unfold all the implicit instances in which these 
could be recognized, here we will focus on those instances where both the 
initial problem that The Wire poses and the final answer to this problem 
are given an explicit formulation. 
The first explicit formulation of the problem to which The Wire as a 
whole can be seen to respond is found in the opening scenes of the episode 
entitled “Hamsterdam” (S03E04), featuring Major Howard “Bunny” Colvin. 
This episode begins with a young police officer at a Westside community 
meeting trying to convince the residents of that district that the crime 
rate is down in their neighborhoods. Those present at the meeting are 
not reassured by the officer’s (empty) words, or by the statistics shown in 
charts beside him. In an attempt to calm the situation, Major Colvin takes 
the podium. His monologue is worth quoting in full: 
I’m Major Colvin. I apologize for giving you the wrong impression tonight. 
We mean no disrespect. I know what’s going on in your neighbourhoods. I 
see it every day. Ma’am, it pains me that you cannot enter your own front door 
in safety and with dignity. The truth is ... I can’t promise you it’s gonna get 
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any better. We can’t lock up the thousands out there on the corners. There’d 
be no place to put them even if we could. We show you charts and statistics 
like they mean something. But you’re going back to your homes tonight, 
we’re gonna be in our patrol cars and them boys still gonna be out there on 
them corners ... deep in the game. This here is the world we got, people. 
And it’s about time all of us had the good sense to at least admit that much. 
The sincerity of Major Colvin’s approach catches the audience off guard. 
After listening to his speech in silence, someone asks the obvious question: 
“So, what’s the answer?” Major Colvin’s retort follows from, and poignantly 
concludes, his preceding monologue: “Well, I’m not sure. But whatever it 
is, it can’t be a lie.”
In the context of this scene, both Major Colvin’s claims and the question 
that they prompted clearly refer to the world of the drug trade. But it doesn’t 
take much perspicuity to notice that this whole scene can and should be 
extrapolated so as to refer not only to that world, but also, more importantly, 
to the world of The Wire as a whole. As each of its five seasons show, all 
the aspects of this world—that is, all the institutions that constitute it (the 
police force, city and state politics, macroeconomic forces, the school system, 
the media)—are equally corrupt, and in need of radical change. How this 
change is to be effected is the central problem of The Wire as a whole, and it 
is precisely in the scene described above that this problem is first explicitly 
formulated. If we reformulate this question slightly, it could be argued that 
the central problem of The Wire is none other than the “hard problem” of all 
leftist political thought, first formulated by V. I. Lenin: What is to be done?
Although Major Colvin refuses to commit to an answer to this difficult 
question at this juncture, it is he who will eventually provide the explicit 
formulation of its resolution as proposed by The Wire, and therefore of 
the final commitment that it endorses. Colvin’s answer comes in a short 
scene from the penultimate episode of the fifth season, entitled “Late 
Editions” (S05E09). The scene begins with Mayor Carcetti giving a short 
press conference after the citywide school debate, for which he tries to 
take credit, saying, “What you have seen here today is indicative of the 
progress that city schools are making under this current administration”. A 
segment of this debate was shown earlier in the episode, in a scene featuring 
Namond Brice as one of the debaters, and Bunny Colvin and his wife as 
proud spectators of Namond’s academic success. Seeing Colvin walking 
to the car with his family, Mayor Carcetti interrupts the press conference 
to approach him, and tries to apologize for his actions regarding Colvin’s 
Hamsterdam experiment in season three: “You know, I always wanted to 
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say how sorry I am how things turned out. There wasn’t anything I could 
have done with your experiment in the third district. There wasn’t anything 
that anyone could have done with that.” Seemingly irritated at first, Bunny 
cools down. After a short glance at the media in the background, he turns 
to Carcetti and with an expression of indignation mixed with resignation, 
he utters: “Yeah, well, I guess, Mr Mayor ... There’s nothing to be done.”
There’s nothing to be done. With these words The Wire responds to 
the question of what is to be done. And it is with these words that The Wire 
makes explicit what was implicit all along: that any and every challenge to 
the established order of its world is doomed to fail. There is nothing, and 
never was anything, to be done. All there is is a world of “doomed and fated 
protagonists” oblivious to the fact that their fate is sealed, and with hubris 
enough to believe that their individual efforts might bring change. This is 
the tragic world of The Wire. 
To recognize The Wire as real is to recognize its tragic world as our 
own. And it is precisely because it forces us to confront the tragic condition 
of our current predicament that The Wire resonates so strongly. Just like 
“the doomed and fated protagonists” of The Wire, we too seem incapable of 
conceiving of a meaningful answer to the question “What is to be done?” 
let alone doing anything sensible about it. We might be excused, then, for 
concluding along with Bunny Colvin that there really is nothing to be done. 
The Wire then becomes a testament to the heroic acceptance of our tragic 
fate. There is nothing to be done, and we’d better learn to accept it. Or, in 
the words of Bunny Colvin, “This here is the world we got, people. And 
it’s about time all of us had the good sense to at least admit that much.”
But surely this cannot be all there is to The Wire. And indeed it is not. If 
we are to comprehend in full the singular import of The Wire, we have to take 
a closer look at what it does in what it says. In saying its fatalistic conclusion 
“There’s nothing to be done”, The Wire makes this claim explicit. In doing 
so, it does the only, and arguably the most important, thing to be done at 
this point: it introduces this claim into the space of reasons. And to echo Slim 
Charles’ memorable pronouncement, “once you in it, you in it”!11 In other 
11 After Avon Barksdale reveals to Slim Charles (“Mission Accomplished”, S03E12) 
that Marlo wasn’t responsible for Stringer’s assassination (although this was presented as 
the main reason to continue the “war” against Marlo), Slim responds: “Don’t matter who 
did what to who at this point. Fact is, we went to war, and now there ain’t no going back. I 
mean, shit, it’s what war is, you know? Once you in it, you in it. If it’s a lie, then we fight on 
that lie. But we gotta fight.”
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words, once a claim has been placed into the space of reasons, it is forever 
after open to being rationally assessed, and thus challenged or defended. 
As we have seen, The Wire as a whole can be interpreted as a long slow 
rational reconstruction, and therefore vindication, of the process by which 
it arrived at its fatalistic conclusion. It has presented its case in defence of 
its fatalistic claim, and it is a compelling one indeed. Insofar as we recognize 
The Wire as real, we accept its arguments and recognize its claim as true. But 
no matter how compelling an argument The Wire presents, and no matter 
how inevitable its fatalistic conclusion might seem at the present juncture, 
nothing precludes us from questioning its claims further. Quite the contrary: 
not only are we entitled to pose such a challenge but we are obliged to. For, 
unlike the tragic world of The Wire, ruled as it is by indifferent gods who 
determine the fates of their subjects once and for all, our world is governed 
by a peculiar force: the normative force of the better reason. As subjects 
in the space of reasons, we are responsible for having reasons for each and 
every act and commitment that we undertake. Further, we are liable for our 
reasons to be normatively assessed and challenged, but we are also obliged to 
normatively assess and challenge the reasons given by others. Finally, when 
presented with a better reason, we ought to renounce any commitment that 
might be seen as weak in the face of a given challenge.
What makes our world, governed as it is by the force of the better 
reason, so peculiar, and so different from the tragic world of The Wire, is 
that we are at once its creatures, and its creators. We are bound by its norms 
of rationality only insofar as we bind ourselves by them. It is precisely by 
constraining ourselves by its conceptual norms that we achieve the degree 
of positive expressive freedom that makes us the only masters of our world 
and the sole creators of our fate. As Nietzsche (2000) knew perfectly 
well, rationalism always was and always will be the best antidote to 
tragedy. Or, as Omar Little would say, “All in the game, yo, all in the 
game”. The game of giving and asking for reasons. Indeed.
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